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Abstract 
In this essay I systematically incorporate empirical work on rising income inequality and 
wage stagnation into a regulation theoretic framework for analysing macroeconomic 
growth. The rise of job polarisation and income inequality coincides with a long period of 
macroeconomic stagnation, both continuing through to the present (with the exception of 
a brief period of strong growth and declining inequality in the second half of the 1990s). 
The corporate scramble to restore profit rates after the crisis of Fordism has transformed 
the institutional configuration of the political economy. In particular, institutions 
supporting upward mobility and middle-class incomes in the economy have been eroded 
by the twin forces of internationalisation (leading to the reemergence of wage-based 
competition) and employment externalisation (outsourcing, downsising, antiunionism, 
etc). The current growth regime, which may be characterised as Waltonist, based on the 
Wal-Mart model of buyer-driven global supply chains focused on cutthroat wage-based 
competition and deunionisation, is not transitional but rather embedded in apparently 
long-term institutional settlements that amount to a dysfunctional regime.  
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The dramatic rise in inequality in the US since the early 1970s is well documented 
(Piketty and Saez 2003). Likewise, the increase in low-wage jobs and careers, decline of 
internal labour markets and expansion of labour market uncertainty have also been amply 
demonstrated (Bernhardt et al. 2001). Together, these and related trends can be 
summarised in terms of a structural expansion in labour market insecurity, broadly 
understood as a decline in access to an employment trajectory leading to a stable job or 
occupation with a livable wage. These changes can be characterised as structural not 
simply because they are secular rather than cyclical, but also because long-standing 
regularities in economic relationships have changed. For instance, the link between 
productivity and wage growth has been severed (Mishel et al. 2007) and the long-term 
payoff to higher education has become more variable (Bernhardt et al. 2001). These 
changes suggest a broad transformation in the institutional configuration of the American 
economy. 
Labor market researchers have produced a growing body of indispensible 
empirical work on growing labour market insecurity, which is generally attributed to 
discrete changes in specific institutional domains, such as the internationalisation of 
financial markets or decline of unions (see, for instance, Appelbaum et al. 2003), but 
without systematically examining how various institutional changes may be related to 
each other or may be part of a broader structural transformation in the economy. In 
contrast, regulation theorists (Boyer 2004) have focused analysis directly on the complex 
ways in which various institutional domains – such as corporate governance, industrial 
relations and financial systems – interact and coalesce to form distinct growth 
trajectories. However, regulationists, like most other comparative political economists, 
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have not systematically addressed the rise of low-wage employment and inequality in 
their research on comparative performance and macroeconomic growth.  
In this essay I link well-known problems in the US labour market that have 
dramatically increased over the last four decades – job polarization, wage stagnation and 
rising inequality – to the ongoing problem of slow macroeconomic growth. Regulation 
theory has elaborated a compelling argument that the golden age of American capitalism, 
from around 1950 to the early 1970s, was based on a distinct growth regime, referred to 
as Fordism, which provided an institutional framework able to generate strong growth in 
middle-income employment levels resulting in high levels of effective demand and thus a 
virtuous circle of growth based on mass production and mass consumption. But as Fordist 
institutions began to collapse in the early 1970s, job polarisation and income inequality 
began a steady rise while macroeconomic growth began a long period of stagnation, both 
continuing through to the present (with the exception of a brief period of strong growth 
and declining inequality in the second half of the 1990s). I argue that both sets of 
problems – labour market insecurity and slow growth – can be traced to a changing 
institutional configuration in the political economy whereby the institutions supporting 
upward mobility and middle-class incomes in the economy have been eroded by the 
growth of the twin forces of internationalisation (leading to the reemergence of wage-
based competition) and employment externalisation (outsourcing, downsizing, 
antiunionism, etc). 
Among regulationists, the postfordist period from the 1970s to the present has 
generally been seen as a sort of transitional phase, as the economy awaits the 
establishment of a new growth dynamic based in a new institutional settlement (Lipietz 
 3 
1992; Boyer 2000; Friedman 2000). In contrast, I am arguing here that the postfordist 
growth regime in the US is not transitional but rather constituted by apparently long-term 
institutional settlements that amount to a dysfunctional regime. I argue here that the 
current accumulation regime of the US economy is usefully characterized as Waltonism, 
based on the fact that the Walton family’s Wal-Mart has become the largest employer in 
the US economy, which now has a larger share of employment in retail trade than in 
manufacturing. The central problem concerns institutional transformations in the 
economy which have led to the diffusion of a model of externalised employment 
relations, based on vertical disintegration, subcontracting, downsizing, deunionisation 
and contingent work. These forms of employment externalisation have been driven by a 
declining profit rate along with intensified competition resulting from the 
internationalisation of production (and ideologically facilitated by the ascendance of the 
shareholder value model of corporate governance). While these transformations by no 
means all trace back to Wal-Mart, the latter represents both the internationalisation of the 
economy (via buyer-driven global supply chains) and the externalisation of employment 
(vehement anti-unionism and low-wage competition) that has made it the most successful 
American company in the broader postfordist context.  
 
Accumulation regimes as institutional models of capitalist growth  
With the concept of general equilibrium, neoclassical theory attempts to analyse as stable 
and harmonious what are, as a matter of historical record, industrialising and 
industrialised market societies characterised by extended periods of conflict, with 
relatively short spans of stability punctuated by times of extreme instability and/or 
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economic crisis. Given that human society is constantly undergoing transformation, that 
the institutions that provide the glue of society – from cultural understandings to norms to 
formal organisations – are variable across time and space, a central issue for political 
economy is the question of reproduction. Indeed, the language of equilibrium and 
efficiency serve to whitewash all of the debilitations and inefficiencies endogenously 
generated by the competitive struggle over profits (Vidal 2009; Vidal 2011a). In contrast, 
as Aglietta (2000 [1979]) has forcefully argued, the concept of regulation, broadly 
understood, can be used to anchor an alternative economic theory – one that can 
accommodate the question of reproduction and account for crisis – in a manner 
equivalent to that of general equilibrium for neoclassical theory.  
Regulation theory approaches the problem of growth through the concept of a 
regime of accumulation, which refers to a macroeconomic pattern of growth based on an 
institutional settlement within and across various domains of a national economy (Boyer 
and Saillard 2002). In seeking to define how institutional settlements have contributed to 
growth within particular countries, most regulationists have maintained that stable, strong 
growth occurs when institutional relations within and across these various domains 
coalesce into a so-called mode of regulation that supports and guides a regime of 
accumulation. A mode of regulation is supposed to ensure coherency and vibrancy within 
an accumulation regime when the two are structurally coupled, and slow growth when the 
former gets out of sync with the latter, ultimately leading to a structural crisis due to 
incompatibility between the accumulation regime and its mode of regulation (Jessop 
1997; Boyer and Saillard 2002).  
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Such theoretically-driven preoccupations with institutional coherence in 
comparative political economy are increasingly giving way to an emphasis on 
‘disruption, incompleteness and incoherence’ (Froud et al. 2007; see also Crouch 2005). 
In this spirit, I have argued elsewhere in detail that the concept of a mode of regulation, 
and its associated assumptions of functionalism and institutional coherence, should be 
rejected by regulation theorists because it is empirically suspect and has ultimately 
hindered theoretical development (Vidal 2011c).1 In that essay I address the recent 
regulationist literature in detail and argue that not only is the concept of a mode of 
regulation theoretically indefensible – on what analytical grounds could one rigorously 
distinguish between the underlying social relations constituting the accumulation regime 
and the surrounding institutional environment? – but that a consistent distinction between 
which social relations are part of an accumulation versus which are part of a mode of 
regulation cannot be found in the literature. Rather than searching for emerging modes of 
regulation, regulation theory should return to its original Marxian formulation as a 
disequilibrium approach (Aglietta 2000 [1979]), focusing on the problems generated by 
existing institutional settlements without assuming an eventual return to strong growth.  
While Marx demonstrated that it is theoretically possible for expanded 
reproduction with balanced growth, because aggregate demand – wages – is a component 
of capitalist investment (Shaikh 1978), this theoretical possibility by no means ensures 
smooth accumulation and balanced growth in the real world. Its realisation depends, 
among other things, on the distribution of the total social product among the population, 
the structure of investment opportunities and the composition of actual (private and 
public) investment; in short, on the state of the class struggle.    
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 When Marx theorised the possibility of balanced growth by dividing the economy 
into two major sectors, the producer goods (Department I) and the consumer goods 
(Department II) sectors, he provided the first analysis of the ‘Keynesian’ problem of 
effective demand. Aglietta built on Marx’s model of expanded reproduction to articulate 
a theoretical framework for the institutional analysis of transformation and growth in the 
capitalist economy. The 20th century ushered in a regime of intensive accumulation based 
on the extension of capitalist production into the consumer goods sectors, but it did not 
develop into a stable and vibrant growth regime – Fordism – until a new norm of 
consumption was established with the institutionalisation of a class compromise in the 
form of wages indexed to productivity (via pattern bargaining based on the collective 
agreements reached in the auto sector) (Aglietta 2000 [1979]: Ch 1, section II). In short, 
the central institutional settlement underlying the Fordist growth regime is found in a 
system of employment relations that allowed the growth of middle class consumption 
patterns. This may be termed an internalisation model of employment relations, based on 
the existence of mid-level jobs via internal labour markets in vertically integrated firms 
and the payment of relatively high wages indexed to productivity via collective 
bargaining. The widespread adopt of internalised employment relations was made 
possible in part by the structural context of an oligopolistic, nationally-bound market, 
which allowed competitive pressures to be subordinated to progressive employment 
relations.  
 
The rate of profit and effective demand: Fordism as a historically unique growth regime  
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Some early Marxist regulationists, such as Lipietz (1982), placed the profit rate at centre 
stage: as the profit rate began to decline at the end of the 1960s, capital could no longer 
afford to fund the relatively high wages that supported effective demand. Indeed, a well-
documented decline in the profit rate (Figure 1) from around 1966 through to the early 
1980s, is the best single measure of the crisis of Fordism. Unfortunately, the critical role 
of the profit rate has been lost as regulationists have moved away from Marxism toward 
post-Keynesianism. However, my argument here is that the profit rate determines the 
conditions within which class compromise can take place; wage-led effective demand can 
only occur when a satisfactory profit rate can be maintained without cutting into labour’s 
share of the total product. Yet, such a situation appears to have been historically limited 
to the Fordist period; the recovery of the profit rate in the 1990s has come precisely at the 
expense of labour’s share, likely undercutting effective demand and certainly 
contributing to an explosion of household debt.2  
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE.] 
 
While Marx argued the rate of profit will tend to fall as a result of the increasing 
organic composition of capital – a an argument supported by the data for the 1966-79 
decline (Wolff 2003) – he also noted this tendency may be offset by other 
countertendencies, including the periodic ‘destruction of capital through crises’ (Marx 
1989: 127, quoted in /Kliman, 2010 #262). Thus, the Great Depression and WWII led to 
a massive decline in the value of physical capital and the nominal value of financial 
assets, setting the stage for a resurgence in the profit rate. By one measure (‘net profit 
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rate, private economy’ in Figure 1), the profit rate rose from 17.1 per cent in 1947 to a 
peak of 19.1 per cent in 1966, then falling to a low of 10.7 per cent in 1982 and 
recovering to 17.3 per cent by 1997 (Duménil et al. 1984; Shaikh 1987; Moseley 1999; 
Wolff 2003; see also Kliman 2010).  
These data suggest that the historically high profit rates of the Fordist period 
made possible the class compromise leading to an expansion of middle class consumption 
patterns. Examining the profit rate from the 1880s through the 1980s, Duménil and 
collaborators (1985) find that the Fordist period of exceptionally high profit rates appears 
to be an historical anomaly. That the postfordist decline in profit rates set off a frantic 
struggle by corporations to restore profitability is an observation accepted by many non-
marxist scholars (e.g., Bluestone and Harrison 2000). The resurgence of the profit rate to 
near-historical highs around the turn of the century appears to have been the fruit of wage 
concessions, employment externalisation and global outsourcing, and the decline in the 
real value of wages (Moseley 1999), but the period of resurgence is based on a short and 
turbulent period that would suggest caution in extrapolating longer-term trends regarding 
a return to profitability (Nichter 2008). In any case, as will be shown below, the 
restoration of the profit rate has come at the expense of middle class consumption 
patterns, being based in an assault on labour and wages therefore exacerbating the 
problem of effective demand.  
Noting the long-standing interpretive dispute over Marx’s reproduction schemes 
in Volume II, Kliman argues for an unbalanced growth interpretation, which has fallen 
out of favor among Marxists since WWI vis-à-vis the balanced growth interpretation 
(1992 [1885]; 2001). The latter views Marx as arguing that for expanded reproduction to 
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occur, there must be a balance between growth in the producer goods sector and the 
consumer goods sector; if there is not sufficient demand from consumers, investment in 
capital equipment will lead to overproduction due to a lack of demand for such 
equipment by producers in the consumer goods sector. Kliman (2001) argues, in contrast, 
that capital investment itself can generate effective demand. While possible in principle, 
this argument does not account for the possibility that investment may be diverted from 
productive uses into speculation à la Magdoff and Sweezy (see Foster and Magdoff 
2009). I largely follow Aglietta’s interpretation, which is that there is a tendency toward 
uneven development in the producer goods sector, but that stable, strong growth requires 
expanded markets for consumer goods. This interpretation is borne out by the US case, 
where the prefordist period was characterised by ‘jerky’ growth with overproduction the 
producer goods and a retarded market for consumer goods, only giving way to more 
stable and vibrant growth based on the commodification of the consumer goods sector 
and the Fordist class compromise that substantially increased effective consumer 
demand.  
The upshot is that the profit rate and the income distribution are complementary 
explanations. There does appear to be a long-term tendency for the rate of profit to fall, as 
Marx predicted, which sets the conditions for the class struggle/compromise. Within 
these constraints, however, the distribution of income does matter; unbalanced growth 
based in investment demand, with limited consumer demand, will lead to spasmodic 
growth and ultimately a crisis of overproduction. Restoring and expanded middle class 
consumption patterns to drive effective demand – through wage income rather than debt 
– could provide a basis for stronger and more stable growth, but there remains a question 
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as to whether Fordist-level profit rates are compatible with labour’s share of the national 
product also at Fordist levels in the postfordist context. If it is the case that Fordist profit 
levels were an historical anomaly driven by the massive destruction of capital values in 
the Great Depression and WWII, the prospects for a Fordist-type compromise are not 
good. As I argue below, the Waltonist regime of accumulation in the US is predicated on 
antiunionism and a substantial growth in peripheral, low-wage employment. This 
suggests that the restoration of the profit rate has been achieved through a decline in 
labour’s share, an interpretation consistent with all of the data presented below. And the 
more general problem of internationalised production has undercut the conditions for 
relatively high-wage employment as a widespread domestic employment strategy. The 
problem is that in the postfordist period, slow growth appears to take place in a situation 
where the profit rate can only be restored at the expense of labour’s share of the national 
production. There does not appear to be a clear institutional fix other than either partially 
separating the link between employment and income, such as through a basic income 
guarantee, or public control of investment decisions. I now briefly review the Fordist 
growth regime before turning to systematic analysis of the Waltonist growth regime in 
postfordist America.  
 
The Fordist growth regime and its decline  
The golden age of Fordism, characterised by extraordinary growth combined with 
decreasing inequality, was experienced by the major capitalist democracies for roughly 
two-to-three decades following WWII. Although the dates for individual countries differ, 
the data on growth rates and other key variables tend to date the Fordist period roughly 
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from 1950 to around 1973. Looking at the average for 16 advanced capitalist economies, 
GDP grew at an average rate of 4.9 per cent from 1950-73 versus 2.5 per cent from 1973-
9; GDP per capita for the same periods was 3.8 per cent versus 2.0 per cent (Glyn et al. 
2007, their emphasis). By 1973, profit rates had dropped by one-third from their peak 
year in the US (1966), Europe (1960), and Japan (1970) (Glyn et al. 2007). After 1973, 
there was a general fall in output, productivity and export growth across the countries. 
Looking specifically at the US, Figure 2 presents average annual growth rates for the 
eight decades from 1930 through 2009. The Fordist decades of the 1950s and ‘60s saw 
average growth rates of 4.2 and 4.4 per cent respectively, followed by 3.3 per cent in the 
‘70s, 3.1 per cent in the 80s, 3.2 per cent in the ‘90s, and just 1.8 per cent in the 2000s. 
Annual nonfarm business productivity growth in the US (Figure 3) averaged 2.8 per cent 
from 1947-73, dropping to just 1.1 per cent from 1973-9 and 1.4 per cent from 1979-90, 
never reaching its Fordist level again through 2009.  
 
[FIGURES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Not only was Fordist growth remarkable in absolute terms, but also for being 
broadly shared among the population. As Figure 4 shows, the US economy experienced 
an unprecedented period of historically-low wage inequality in the 1950s and ‘60s, 
roughly corresponding with the period of Fordist growth. Examining the Gini ratio for 
families shows that inequality trended downward throughout the Fordist period, 
beginning a steady rise from the early 1970s through to the present, as the economy saw 
waves of deunionisation and restructuring in a corporate scramble to regain a satisfactory 
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profit rate. It is a key argument of regulation theory that the dynamic of strong, stable 
growth with equity is not coincidental; rather, the fact of broadly shared prosperity made 
possible strong demand which is a crucial component of the virtuous circle of Fordist 
growth. The data clearly bear out a close connection between wage growth and 
productivity growth under Fordism. As shown in Figure 6, average wages grew in 
tandem with productivity throughout the Fordist period until 1973, when a sustained 
period of wage stagnation set in. The Fordist compromise began to unravel in the late 
1960s, became widely apparent around 1973, and saw the final nails hammered into its 
coffin in 1979/1980 with the appointment of Paul Volcker to the Fed and the election of 
neoliberal Ronald Reagan to the US presidency.  
 
[FIGURES 4 AND 5 ABOUT HERE] 
  
The postfordist regime of accumulation in the United States  
Erosion of Fordist institutions through internationalisation and financialisation  
Along with internationalising markets, internationalised production has burst asunder the 
national-level institutions of Fordism – nationally-bound, oligopolistic markets; 
internalised employment relations; national-level pattern bargaining – that ensured wages 
were a source of effective demand, largely keeping them out of competition. Fordist 
employment and compensation norms included internal labour markets and a family-
supporting wage in exchange for a commitment of lifetime loyalty to a firm. Effectively, 
within the core of the economy, labour had been decommodified under the welfare 
capitalism of vertically-integrated Fordist firms with their internal labour markets. But 
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this internalised model of employment relations became unsustainable in the face of 
internationalisation, in particular, competition from low-wage countries. Thus, an 
increasing number of workers have been subjected to market pressures for wage 
determination, skill formation and job mobility, and employment tenure, effectively 
expanding the periphery of the labour market.  
At the same time as the US economy began to experience intensified international 
competition, it also experienced a well-documented productivity slowdown. In response, 
corporate America began a wave of intensive restructuring to shed costs. The costs of the 
internalisation model of employment relations had become too great due to the build up 
of labour costs in vertically-integrated firms. One of the most common responses was for 
corporations to shed assets. While such restructuring may have generated many 
organisational efficiencies for more flexible organisations in new network configurations, 
the other side of the coin was the growth of peripheral employment conditions, including 
non-unionised and insecure employment. All of these pressures for externalisation of 
employment found their ideological expression, and justification, in the rise of the 
shareholder value model of corporate governance. Further, in addition to putting pressure 
on internalised employment relations, the internationalisation of production has also 
facilitated financialisation in another way: Milberg and Winkler (2009) have shown 
empirically that cost reductions generated from outsourcing increased profits in the non-
financial corporate sector, which, in turn, channeled the increased profit into purchases of 
speculative financial assets (rather than more productive investment).  
While the economy was experiencing internationalisation and deindustrialisation, 
it was also becoming increasingly financialised, largely due to a growing surplus of 
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financial capital and an exhaustion of opportunities for investment in the productive 
sectors of the economy (Foster and Magdoff 2009). Thus, financial sector profits rose 
from just 8 per cent of total corporate profits in 1945 to nearly 18 per cent in 1999 and the 
ratio of portfolio income to cash flow for non-financial corporations rose from less than 
10 per cent in 1950 to 40 per cent in 2001 (Brenner 2003; Krippner 2005). The deep 
changes in the economy leading to financialisation ushered in a context conducive to the 
shareholder value model of corporate governance, a model that explicitly encouraged 
‘asset light’ strategies. During the period of Fordism, corporations experienced high 
levels of growth both internally and through merges and acquisitions. The dominant 
model of corporate governance was based on retaining both money and people in order to 
reinvest in the both physical and human capital, a model that Lazonick and O’Sullivan 
call ‘retain and reinvest’ (2000). However, when hit with a profit crisis in the 1970s, 
institutional investors associated declining corporate performance with vertically-
integrated firms and the retain-and-reinvest model of governance. As a result of the 
growing power of institutional investors and the emerging corporate takeover market, 
corporations began to recruit finance-oriented CEOs (Fligstein and Markowitz 1993). At 
the same time, policy makers began to deregulate the financial sector, resulting in a 
perfect storm that institutionalised the shareholder value model of the firm, leading 
corporations to be managed on the new principle of ‘downsize and distribute’ (Lazonick 
and O'Sullivan 2000). A key outcome of the shareholder revolution was thus a new norm 
of externalised employment relations.  
 
Waltonism in the United States  
 15 
The changes just discussed have developed as part of an organic process of 
transformation from a Fordist accumulation regime into something new. However, 
dysfunctional this something new is, it appears to be rooted in a relatively stable set of 
institutional settlements in the broad system of employment relations, specifically within 
firm governance and interfirm relations. In general, these postfordist settlements are 
reactions to a dual institutional shift, as production has been subordinated to finance 
(hence shareholder value) while employment relations have been subordinated to new 
forms of competition (hence externalised employment). For the remainder of this essay, I 
develop my analysis of the postfordist accumulation regime in the US, a regime that may 
be termed Waltonism, in reference to the Wal-Mart business model pioneered by Sam 
Walton, representing a model of ‘lean retailing’ (Abernathy et al. 1999) and low-wage 
competition in an internationalised economy.  
By 2003 Wal-Mart was the largest employer in the US, Canada and Mexico, and 
the largest profit-making company in the world. It has become so powerful that it has 
effectively been able to determine the real minimum wage in the US and shape popular 
consumption patterns as well as force the restructuring of entire global supply chains 
(Lichtenstein 2006; Petrovic and Hamilton 2006). While it is important to remember that 
many of the practices that characterise the Wal-Mart business model were developed by 
other companies in the retail sector, in particular by other discounters over the 1960s-80s, 
Wal-Mart forged these practices – along with some of its own homegrown technical 
innovations and managerial strategies – into a business model allowing it to have more 
sales by the early 2000s than Target, Home Depot, Sears, Kmart, Safeway and Kroger 
combined (Lichtenstein 2006; Strasser 2006).  
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 The Waltonist accumulation regime may be contrasted with the Fordist regime on 
four points symbolised by the contrasting strategies and positions of Ford and Wal-Mart. 
While the following points are made with reference to individual firms, they are meant to 
capture dominant tendencies within the broader political economy, focusing on 
employment relations and competitive strategy. First, whereas Ford represented the 
manufacturing-based, nationally-oriented economy, Wal-Mart symbolises the service-
dominated, internationalised economy. Second, and closely related, while Ford pioneered 
the supply-driven, producer-dominated supply chains, Wal-Mart was a leader in 
establishing demand-driven, buyer-dominated global supply chains (Gereffi 1994). 
Essentially, Wal-Mart was able to capitalise on a sectoral transformation and the shifting 
balance of power from manufacturers to retailers, honing existing industry practices and 
adding many of its own technological innovations to become a paragon of lean retailing. 
Information technology-intensive inventory management methods such as point-
of-sale scanning and Universal Product Code (UPC) tracking were developed in the 
supermarket industry in the 1970s. During the 1980s, it was Kmart and Wal-Mart, along 
with some apparel retailers, that were the leaders in extending these technologies, chiefly 
by pressuring suppliers to tag their products before delivery, and to develop new 
capabilities for just-in-time delivery to automated distribution centers. In addition to the 
systematic use of codes, tags, scanning and automation, this system of lean retailing is 
based on the adoption of strict communication standards through the supply chain. Wal-
Mart pioneered logistical systems connecting suppliers, distribution centers and stores in 
real-time, providing a level of just-in-time supply-chain responsiveness that would be the 
envy even of Toyota (and, in the process, gaining the largest privately owned satellite 
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network in the country and the largest private collection of data in the world). But IT has 
only been part of the story. Given its extensive market power – 15 per cent of domestic 
sales in general merchandise and food and nearly 30 per cent of household staples and 
basic apparel; 30 per cent of total foreign buying in China – Wal-Mart has been able to 
force suppliers to open their books and to dictate – as a matter of getting the business – 
that suppliers commit to its own strategy of high volume, rapid-turnover, and low-
margins (Petrovic and Hamilton 2006). 
Third, in contrast to the relatively high wages paid by Ford, Wal-Mart has become 
the largest employer in the country through its cut-throat, wage-based competition. While 
mass merchandisers initiated the high-volume, low-markup strategy in the early 20th 
century, major players such as Sears adopted a welfare capitalism model of internalised 
employment relations similar to manufacturing firms, and national chains courted unions 
as partners in the 1930s (Strasser 2006). But as discount stores like Kmart and Wal-Mart 
began operating on a new low-cost business model in the 1960s and ‘70s, they introduced 
a model into the competitive field in which low-wages were absolutely necessary for 
profitability. When margins are so low that the only way to make a profit is through 
volume, keeping labour costs to an absolute minimum is of paramount importance. 
Whereas relatively high wages were considered part of business for Ford (they were 
internalised into the business model) ruthlessly minimising wage costs is a core element 
of the Wal-Mart business strategy. From its earliest years, scheming on wage costs has 
been a systematic part of Wal-Mart’s business strategy. For instance, Sam Walton had set 
up the first three Wal-Marts as legally different companies so that each would have low 
enough employment levels to be exempt from paying the national minimum wage. Stores 
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are staffed with unskilled employees who were subject to any number of rules restricting 
worker autonomy or skill. Customer-worker interaction is governed by strict rules and an 
overall environment of intimidation and peer monitoring is encouraged (Adams 2006). 
Managers are given tight labour budgets that ensure chronic understaffing, leading to 
work intensification and all manner of illegal activities such as forcing workers to work 
off the clock, to the extent that in 2004 Wal-Mart faced 38 lawsuits for wage abuse 
(Rosen 2006). Fourth and finally, rather than participating in a class compromise through 
accepting unions as legitimate actors in the system of employment relations, Wal-Mart 
has pursued a vehement anti-union strategy, having successfully fended off myriad 
unionisation attempts to this day.  
It is important to recognise that these four elements of the Waltonist growth 
regime are not intended to apply uniformly to all firms across the economy. Indeed, the 
first two elements – a service-based, internationalised economy and the dominance of 
buyer-driven supply chains – are not individual firm strategies as such, but are the 
outcomes of broader institutional transformation associated with technical change and 
competition common across a range of industrialised countries. That is, they are 
characteristic of postfordism more generally. The second two – low-wage competition 
and vehement antiunionism – are specific firm strategies associated with Wal-Mart as a 
market leader (although of course they are not exclusive to Wal-Mart). But they are better 
understood as dominant tendencies. There is variation in the extent to which such 
strategies are dominant and legitimate within other national contexts.  
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
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These four differences between Fordism and Waltonism are schematic. A more 
elaborate set of distinctions can be found in Table 1. The regulationist wage-labour nexus 
can usefully be separated into two components: the labour process and employment 
relations. The former refers specifically to the concrete organisation of tasks, processes 
and relations in the workplace, whereas the latter refers the organisational structure of 
employment and the system of collective bargaining. This distinction is of fundamental 
importance for two reasons. First, under postfordism the conditions of employment 
relations have been severed from the organisation of work, due to the relative institutional 
shift toward wage-driven competition and shareholder value. For instance, manufacturers 
may be implement lean production with outsourcing or insourcing, with a union 
partnership or as part of an anti-union strategy. Second, although regulation theory has 
commonly focused on the labour process as central to defining an accumulation regime, I 
am arguing that the Waltonist regime is best defined in terms of the externalised model of 
employment relations, rather than in terms of a dominant labour process. The model of 
the labour process in Fordist discussions and early postfordist debates was squarely 
focused on manufacturing. I address the postfordist labour process in both manufacturing 
and services in detail elsewhere (Vidal 2011b). Briefly, the postfordist manufacturing 
labour process par excellence is lean production, which in fact is increasingly diffusing 
throughout the service sector, although it appears to be less applicable to more discrete 
service labour processes, such as retail sales. The core elements of the postfordist labour 
process listed in Table 1 thus do not come from Wal-Mart or the retail sector but rather 
from the lean production model developed by Toyota. However, these practices are 
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directly related to the Waltonist model via the lean retailing strategy, and demand-driven 
production more generally. Turning from the labour process to the broader system of 
employment relations, Wal-Mart’s own employment model includes ruthless price 
cutting in supply chain management, extremely limited internal labour markets and bare-
bones staffing, and vehement anti-unionism. More generally, the US economy has 
experienced widespread vertical disintegration, the recommodification of labour – 
including declining internal labour markets and career ladders and the growth of 
peripheral employment relations – and anti-unionism. 
Transformations toward externalised employment relations have been driven by 
new forms of competition. Nationally-bounded product markets of the Fordist period 
have given way to international markets that are increasingly segmented into high quality 
versus low-cost markets, with a resulting segmentation in consumer markets, with hence 
potentially negative implications for growth (Petit 1999). With wages under intensified 
competitive pressure, Fordist-style local, regional and national compromises are 
increasingly hard to sustain, particularly in internationally traded sectors. These 
transformations in forms of competition have generated increased differentiation both 
within and between sectors, with critical implications for employment relations. In 
particular, increased outsourcing and subcontracting has exacerbated labour market 
segmentation. Due to both vertical disintegration and product market segmentation, 
peripheral work conditions have grown, making it more difficult to enter the core of the 
labour force, thus limiting access to good, stable employment and internal labour markets 
(Petit 1999; Friedman 2000).  
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What is striking about this set of organisational and institutional forms is that the 
technological trajectory they together constitute does not appear to be able to provide a 
basis for a stable, mid-range pattern of growth in the same manner the Fordism did, due 
to the reassertion of wages into competition, the decline of internal labour markets and 
increase in low wage jobs, and new forms of labour market segmentation. My argument 
here is that this lack of institutional coherence is not a refutation of the concept of 
postfordism (Thompson 2003) but a defining feature of the organic social formation of 
the postfordist period, which, rather than a transitional phase is better seen as a 
dysfunctional accumulation regime. 
 
Employment externalisation, debt, and growth in the postfordist accumulation regime 
It is important to not over-romanticise the Fordist period. There were many economic 
problems in the Fordist period too, including that fact that in 1963 fully 21 per cent of the 
year-round, full-time (YRFT) workforce were in low-wage jobs, where the latter are 
defined as jobs making 50 per cent or less of the median annual earnings (Bluestone and 
Harrison 1988). There was also employment insecurity and underemployment within 
peripheral segments of the labour market. When there is talk of good jobs and livelihoods 
under Fordism, it must be remembered that this generally refers to the core of the 
economy. Yet, we have seen that the Fordist period is unique in the history of US 
capitalism for both its spectacular growth rates and relative wage compression. In 
essence, while there were bad jobs under Fordism, a central characteristic of the Fordist 
accumulation regime was an institutional compromise which helped to grow the middle 
class, providing an organisational-level basis for effective demand. In sharp contrast, the 
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postfordist period has been characterised by the lack of such a compromise, thus 
witnessing skyrocketing inequality. Looking at changing income shares by percentile 
from 1979-2003 shows that the top fifth percentile of the income distribution was the 
only group to see its share rise; every quintile in the bottom four-fifths of the income 
distribution saw its share decline over that period (Mishel et al. 2007: Figure 1Q). And 
the turnaround in average wages during the second half of the 1990s did not extend into 
the next decade. In fact, between 2000 and 2005, every quintile in the family income 
distribution saw its income decline, from -0.9 per cent in the top quintile to -7.8 per cent 
in the bottom quintile. It appears that the productivity boost to average incomes in the 
latter half of the 1990s was aberration from the general trend of growing wage inequality. 
Underlying this long-term secular trend of growing wage inequality is a sharp 
polarisation in the job market – that is, a declining middle class. This can be seen in 
different ways from a number of recent studies. In terms of skill levels, between 1980 and 
2000, Autor and collaborators (2006) find a rapid increase in high-skill jobs, a modest 
increase in low-skill jobs, and very slow growth in the middle. Comparing the decades of 
1960s to the 1990s, Wright and Dwyer found that growth was, respectively, 2 versus 17 
per cent in the lowest job-quality decile, 30 versus 11 per cent in the middle two deciles, 
and 40 versus 50 per cent in the top three deciles (2000/2001). Comparing a cohort 
entering the labour market in the mid-1960s with one entering in the early 1980s, 
Bernhardt and collaborators (2001: 111) find that low-wage careers have doubled from 
the earlier cohort to the more recent one, from 12.2 per cent of workers to 27.6 per cent. 
The number of workers in low-wage careers even increased for workers with a bachelor’s 
degree, from 10.4 to 14.1 per cent Underlying these trends is the growth of externalised 
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employment relations and deunionisation (Vidal and Kusnet 2009), leading to overall 
wage stagnation. The real annual average wage for men lost 22 per cent of its value from 
1973 to 1995 but recovered about a third of that loss by 2000, when strong economic 
growth reversed a long-term trend of decline in the real value of the average annual wage. 
(Appelbaum et al. 2003). But as shown above, this turnaround was brief, and the long-
term trend remains one of decline or stagnation. Remarkably, over the 39 year period 
from 1969-2008, wage and salary income for high school educated males aged 25-44 and 
college educated males aged 25-34 declined in real terms (Madrick and Papanikolaou 
2010). While wages and salaries for college educated males aged 35-44 and 45-54 grew 
slightly over the same period (0.2 and 0.5 per cent, respectively), the former declined 
from 1969-89 and the latter declined from 1979-2008.   
The foregoing has provided strong evidence of a qualitatively different 
employment structure under postfordism from that of Fordism: a substantial decrease in 
mid-level jobs and a substantial increase in low-wage careers, leading to a highly 
polarised job structure resulting in wage stagnation and high levels of income inequality. 
While strong wages drove high levels of aggregate demand and vibrant growth during 
Fordism, the situation has become both more complex and precarious in the postfordist 
age of internationalisation cum financialisation. The institutional argument presented here 
suggests that weak aggregate demand due to a decline in labour’s share has played a 
central role in stagnant growth under postfordism, although as discussed in note 2, the 
empirical findings on this are mixed. In either case, the Kaleckian demand regime models 
do not take into account the composition of consumer demand, which, after all, 
constitutes 70 per cent of GDP. Such high levels of personal consumption expenditures 
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have been maintained in the face of stagnating real wages and growing inequality through 
debt: the ratio of consumer debt to income rose from 62 per cent in 1975 to 127 per cent 
in 2005 (Foster and Magdoff 2009). In brief, the restoration of profitability has come at 
the expense of labour’s share, in the process expanding the labour market periphery and 
generating long-term wage stagnation, but with aggregate consumer demand maintained 
through increased household debt.  
Whether or not investment growth can make up for consumption growth at 
existing levels of demand, then, the Waltonist growth regime has experienced growth 
dampened growth due to overcapacity, while it has maintained existing levels of growth 
via a massive increase in debt, all in the context of ever-expanding surplus capital. And, 
in terms of increased precariousness and sources of instability, consumer debt is only the 
tip of the iceberg. Including government, corporate and financial-sector, total debt to 
GDP skyrocketed from about 1.5 times GDP in 1975 to 3.5 times GDP in 2005, with the 
greatest increases being seen in the financial sector (Foster and Magdoff 2009). To be 
sure, there are other sources of growth that have produced some variation around a long-
term trend of tepid growth. On the positive side, the maturation of the information 
revolution boosted productivity in key sectors leading to a brief turnaround in the 1990s – 
a turnaround likely led by Wal-Mart with its lean inventory management practices. On 
the negative side, another aspect of financialisation is the ascendance of neoliberal 
monetary policy, which, with its obsessive focus on price stability (along with anti-deficit 
fiscal policy), has effectively imposed slow growth by policy fiat, because running the 
economy ‘hot’ would risk inflation that is unacceptable to Wall Street, in particular, the 
bond market (Bluestone and Harrison 2000).  
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In sum, the Waltonist regime of accumulation in the US has an inherently-limited 
growth potential, due to overcapacity, financialisation, wages stagnation and growing 
labour market insecurity in the context of neoliberal monetary and fiscal policy. Some of 
the sources of this situation appear to be structural features of postfordism in general, 
including deindustrialisation, internationalisation and financialisation. Regarding 
deindustrialisation, while it remains unclear how much the sectoral shift to services 
contributes to slow growth – among other reasons because there are high wages and high 
productivity in parts of that sector, as well as growing low-wage jobs in manufacturing 
(Petit 1986) – it is arguable that the service sector does have a higher proportion of low-
wage and low-productivity-potential jobs. Other sources appear to be more specifically 
related to Waltonist employment relations, namely, employment externalisation in 
general and antiunionism in particular. These transformations have been part and parcel 
of a shift in the relative articulation of institutional domains, with employment relations 
being subordinated to wage-based competition and a shareholder value model of 
corporate governance.  
 
The financial crisis and the prospects for the dysfunctional Waltonist accumulation 
regime 
At root of the subprime mortgage crisis was the systematic enactment of extremely risky, 
speculative, and predatory behavior by bankers. At the height of the mania, bankers were 
proactively marketing no-income, no-asset (NINA) loans that were contrary to long-
standing banking customs. Manipulative and predatory subprime loans, beginning years 
before the crisis came to a head, were just the beginning. Ultimately, the financial sector 
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fueled a housing bubble with a system-wide infusion of high-risk loans that were 
questionable at best, ratings agencies consulted on how to repackage these high-risk 
assets that would then be certified as nearly risk free, and banks used collateralised debt 
obligations to engage in regulatory arbitrage so they could increase leverage to 
unsustainable levels. Because many of these exotic new financial instruments greatly 
increased the interdependence of the financial system – in the process, increasing 
instability and uncertainty rather than reducing risk – what began as a crisis in the 
subprime lending market quickly spread, first into a meltdown of the entire mortgage 
market and then into a system-wide credit crunch, ultimately brining the entire system to 
its knees in a full-blown, global financial crisis. 
The Marxist regulationist theory presented above provides significant explanatory 
leverage on the financial crisis the late-2000s. In particular, the US economy is a specific 
institutional context where financialisation is most advanced – due to overaccumulation 
and overcapacity – and where the norms of free-market individualism and unrestrained 
profit-seeking are deeply embedded. Industrial capacity has been used at an average of 81 
per cent over the last thirty years (Foster and Magdoff 2009). As the scope for productive 
investment has narrowed, speculative investment has increased. As Wall Street financial 
wizards developed ever more exotic instruments to facilitate speculation, making 
superprofits in the process, the anarchy of the market contributed to competitive mimesis, 
that is, a bandwagon effect (Vidal 2011a). For instance, many bankers knew from 
experience and existing principles that giving NINA loans to subprime borrowers was a 
disaster waiting to happen, but they felt pressure to do the same given that there 
competitors were doing it and making millions. As strategies like pushing NINA loans 
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continued to return outsized profits without any official scrutiny, established norms 
became replaced with new standards. Likewise, if one investment bank was making 
millions off using collateralised debt obligations for regulatory arbitrage, then others 
would experience intense pressure to follow suit. The same could be argued for rating 
agencies, which provided consulting services showing banks how to repackage their 
loans into securities that would get AAA ratings.  
Rather than assuming that markets always generate efficiency, Marxist regulation 
theory focuses on the distorting and debilitating effects of the profit motive and 
competition. In a context of intense market competition, often infused with uncertainty, 
mimetic behavior should be expected. Most market actors are imitators not innovators. 
The Waltonist regime in the US thus provided an ideological context of neoliberalism – 
including the dominance of the ‘efficient market’ hypothesis of self-stabilising financial 
markets and the exaltation of profits and bankers – within a structural context of 
overaccumulation, overcapacity and financialisation.  
While I am hesitant to make any predictions about such an open, complex system 
as the contemporary economy, and am also skeptical of talk of unsustainably in the face 
of the remarkably resilient history of capitalism, I do need to briefly elaborate my 
argument that Waltonism is a dysfunctional yet stable accumulation regime. By 
dysfunctional I refer to its long-term inability to reproduce itself on a high-growth/high-
wage trajectory, that is, its recovery of profit rates at the expense of stagnating wages and 
growing labour market insecurity. Waltonism is not working for the majority of the 
population. By stable I mean to argue that, while the system does contain pronounced 
contradictions and crisis tendencies, human beings and capitalist institutions are 
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exceptionally resilient and, in the absence of an outright crisis in the profit rate or a 
sustained decline in GDP, or perhaps a major shift in the US-China relationship, the 
system is likely to continuing functioning and evolving without collapsing. The fact that 
the US economy made it through the financial crisis, on the backs of workers to be sure, 
is testament to this. Indeed, the top six US bank holding companies posted a combined 
$51 billion in pre-tax profits in 2009 (Lenzner 2010).  
The primary contradiction of Waltonism is the existence of overaccumulation and 
overcapacity in the context of stagnant growth and wages. In addition to being the 
ultimate source of the financial crisis, this growth regime has generated the 
unprecedented levels of debt, which in turn is a potential source of further crisis. Yet, 
from the perspective of capital, the system has effectively recovered from the greatest 
crisis since the Great Depression within a dramatically shorter time period. The Waltonist 
regime is thus dysfunctional yet stable, in large part precisely because American workers 
are so apparently willing to absorb the routine tremors, economic stagnation, and growing 
underemployment and insecurity generated by the accumulation regime. Much of this 
willingness, in turn, stems from the fact that while Waltonism generates wage stagnation 
and high levels of underemployment, effectively cutting the masses out of the slow-yet-
significant growth of the economy, Fordism dramatically reduced the overall level of 
poverty. In 1959 the official poverty rate was 22.4 per cent, declining to its lowest point 
at 11.1 per cent in 1973, and climbing again to 14.3 per cent in 2009, higher than the low 
point although still one-third of the 1959 rate (but highest among the OECD). The Fordist 
regime expanded the core of the labour market and provided career ladders therefore 
reducing poverty. This trend is being reversed under Waltonism, but so far only partially. 
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More generally, the broader working class that has seen stagnating wages has seen an 
increased living standard due to Marx’s process relative surplus value production, 
whereby productivity increases reduce the value of labour by making it cheaper to 
provide basic commodities for the working class. Wal-Mart has been central to this 
process by providing cheap consumer goods from China and other low-wage countries. 
Regulation theory thus provides significant leverage on the class analysis of Waltonism 
via its analysis of the effect of changing (global) production on the conditions of 
existence of the working class, but this analysis will have to be elaborated elsewhere.   
 
Conclusion 
I have sought here to systematically bring to bear the empirical evidence of growing job 
polarisation and inequality on the enduring problem of slow growth in the US economy. 
The polarisation of the labour market and the growth of low-wage careers has been 
driven by a number of forms of employment externalisation, including forced wage 
concessions and other forms of renewed wage cutting; outsourcing, downsising and 
subcontracting; internal restructuring toward flatter hierarchies with core jobs enlarged in 
tasks but reduced in number; and deunionisation. I have argued that externalised 
employment has been the result of two sets of transformations. First is a declining profit 
rate with the maturation the Fordist regime and the transition to a postfordist context of 
intense international competition, both of which have put wages again back at the center 
of the competitive struggle. Second is the specific national-organisational response to this 
general postfordist context, which I have called Waltonism. The latter refers to an 
economy organised in terms of demand-driven, buyer-dominated supply chains, based on 
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cutthroat wage-based competition and vehement antiunionism. In short, a declining profit 
rate and internationalisation led to the erosion of the Fordist compromise, and 
employment externalisation has been the corporate response.  
The restoration of the of the profit rate around the turn of the century to near 
1960s levels – a restored profit rate coinciding with the lowest rates of growth since the 
1960s – has come at the expense of employment conditions and labour’s share. Increased 
labour market insecurity and a decreased share for labour have two likely effects on 
growth. First, they may lead to a deterioration in effective demand, although the 
preliminary data addressing this question are mixed, as it is possible that capital 
investment can offset any losses from deficient consumer demand. Second, and much 
more certainly, the 65-70 per cent of GDP that is accounted for by consumer demand has 
been maintained through increased household indebtedness. This is a potentially 
catastrophic problem with no clear way out (other than a radical program of income 
redistribution). If the foregoing is correct, the conditions for class compromise under 
Fordism – exceptionally high profit rates and nationally bound, oligopolistic competition 
– were historically unique, and the postfordist period is characterised by a more zero-sum 
context for class struggle.   
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Figure 1. Trends in the profit rate, 1947-97 
 
Notes: ♢, net profit rate, private economy; △, gross profit rate, private economy; □, net profit rate, 
corporate sector.   
Source: Wolff (2003). 
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Figure 2. Real GDP growth, USA, 1947-2009 
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Figure 3. Productivity change in the nonfarm business sector, USA, 1947-2009 
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 Figure 4. Family income inequality, USA, 1947 to 2010 
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Figure 5. GDP per capita, median individual income and average wages, USA, 1947-
2004   
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Source: Joel Rogers and Matthew Zeidenberg, Center on Wisconsin Strategy (COWS), personal 
communication, based on data from EH.net, Economic History Association (GDP per capita); US Census 
(individual income); US Bureau of Labor Statistics (average wage). 
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Table 1. Core institutional domains of Fordism and Waltonism 
Fordism Waltonism 
Labour process 
Supply-driven organisation  
(large lots based on forecast) 
Demand-driven organisation 
(smaller lots based on demand) 
Taylorism 
(task fragmentation, standardisation, 
no EI) 
Neotaylorism  
(multitasking or task integration, 
teams, consultative EI w/ 
standardisation) 
or Post-taylorism 
(task integration, teams, substantive 
EI w/ autonomy) 
Employment relations 
Vertical integration  Vertical disintegration  
Decommodified labour 
(internal labor markets) 
Recommodified labour  
(market-mediated employment)  
Acceptance of unions  Anti-unionism 
Competition – sectoral level 
National oligopolistic 
industries/markets 
Segmented industries and 
international markets 
Supply-driven, producer-dominated 
supply chains 
Demand-driven, buyer-dominated 
supply chains  
Competition – organisation level 
Cost  Cost, quality, flexibility   
Wages as part of business  Wages as source of competition 
Retain and reinvest Shareholder value (short-termism) 
Note: EI = employee involvement.  
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1 For previous criticisms of functionalism in regulationist research see Hay (1995) and Ward (2003). 
2 Post-Keynesian macroeconomists distinguish whether accumulation regimes are wage-led or profit-led. 
The models measure the effect of a shift in the profit/wage share on investment and consumption growth. 
Regarding the US case, covering some or all of the period from 1960-2007, at least one study indicated that 
the US is a profit-led regime (Naastepad and Storm 2006-7), but the majority find evidence for a wage-led 
regime (Bowles and Boyer 1995; Hein and Vogel 2008; Onaran et al. 2010). Most of the authors suggest 
caution in interpreting these results because their models are highly sensitive to estimation procedures. 
Onaran et al. suggest that the failure to take financialisation variables into account may have generated 
biased findings of profit-led regimes. It would likely be fruitful to investigate further the complementarities 
or inconsistencies between my institutional approach and the statistical demand-regime approach, 
particularly in terms of long-run dynamics, but such is beyond the scope of this paper. Briefly, however, the 
qualified underconsumptionist component of my argument would suggest a wage-led regime. While robust 
findings of a profit-led demand regime would invalidate a strict underconsumptionist argument, I think the 
current findings are as-yet too inconsistent to make any strong claims. The central concern of these models 
is whether wage-led (i.e., high wage share) demand regimes are viable and, if so, under what conditions. 
While the empirical estimations have generally covered the whole period from 1960-2000, as Marglin and 
Bhaduri (1990) argued it may be that there was a general shift in the 1970s from a wage-led to a profit-led 
regime across the OECD, which may play a role in the inconsistent findings covering the period as if it 
were a single regime. This would be consistent with my core argument: Fordist growth levels were 
extraordinary, and while a high wage share played a critical role in effective demand under Fordism, it may 
not be possible within the the profit rate constraint under postfordist internationalisation. If the postfordist 
economy is becoming profit-led, this is precisely because of its opening up (Bowles and Boyer 1995). If, 
further, a wage-led regime is increasingly unlikely as the economy continues to internationalise, then a 
return to the golden years is even more distant.  
